Thursday, January 11, 2018

We just want things to suck less


Many people (including I suspect Tim Farron) claim that you can't get from an “Is” to an “Ought” meaning that it's flawed to suggest what should be or ought to be from merely a description of or derivation from what is (i.e. Nature). The is-ought problem, as articulated by David Hume (see picture above) is at the heart of the fallacy religious people often use to justify what they consider to be sinful, or not. Many theists will claim that moral truth or "values" (i.e. the "ought" part) can only come from their particular deity, whereas life-experience and nature (the "is" part) is subjective and merely derives from the experiences and whims of men.

As is common with many theistic positions, I feel that they have this entirely the wrong way around. I would argue that it's "revealed" truths that are the subjective and arbitrary elements here, since there is no evidence for them nor any Gods, and plenty to suggest that the whole idea of a supernatural realm was invented and evolved by men to serve the desires and materialistic goals of said men. Rather it's Nature, in fact, that's the only consistent element in this debate, as a conscious species, we just don't understand her all yet.

Now clearly, there's some weight to the theistic position, in many scenarios the ethically "right" thing to do is not be the most obvious (intuitively) thing to do. This particularly applies to things like charity and sacrifice, both cornerstones of what many feel to be virtuous and also what religions latch onto very enthusiastically (when it's in their interests) however there are other view-points. Ethical Naturalism (of which I'm a big fan) takes a different stance to this puzzler. It argues that moral truths do exist (as do theists) but that these truths do in fact relate to facts about physical reality. Ethical Naturalists see no barrier in deriving an ought from an is but that, like in science, all ought's are provisional, pending more evidence and understanding, and most can only be asserted with some degree of probability associated with them. As Hume says, "A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence", I believe this is also true for morals.

Here's a set of steps that the Ethical Naturalist would argue constitutes a recipe for how to get to an ought from an is, it's a modified version of a similar piece that I derived from the work of Neuroscientist Sam Harris, I think it's a reasonable summary of the position.

1/ Let’s assume that there are no ought’s or should’s in this universe. There is only what *is*—the totality of actual (and possible) facts.

2/ Among the myriad things that exist are conscious minds (both animal and human), susceptible to a vast range of actual (and possible) experiences.

3/ Unfortunately, many experiences suck. And they don’t just suck as a matter of cultural convention or personal bias—they really and truly suck. (If you doubt this, place your hand in a Japanese-Hornet nest and report back.)

4/ Conscious minds are natural phenomena. Consequently, if we were to learn everything there is to know about physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, economics, etc., we would know everything there is to know about making our little part of the universe suck less.

5/ If we *should* to do anything in this life, we should avoid what really and truly sucks. (If you consider this question-begging, see point #3 above.)

6/ Of course, we can be confused or mistaken about experience. Something can suck temporarily, only to reveal new experiences which don’t suck at all. On these occasions we say, “At first that sucked, but it was worth it in the end!”

7/ We can also be selfish and short-sighted. Many solutions to our problems are zero-sum (i.e. my gain will be your loss). But *better* solutions aren’t. (By what measure of “better”? Simply fewer things suck for everyone.)

8/ So what is morality? What *ought* sentient beings like ourselves do?

9/ We should, understand how the world works as best we can (facts), so that we can avoid what sucks maximally (values).

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